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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-STATE LICENSING
REGULATION WHICH DELEGATES VETO POWER TO A CHURCH OVER
THE APPROVAL OF LIQUOR LICENSES WITHIN A SPECIFIED DISTANCE OF
SUCH CHURCH VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. (U.S. 1982)
Grendel's Den, Inc. (Grendel's Den),' a restaurant, applied for, and was
denied, a license to sell alcoholic beverages by a local Masachusetts licensing
agency. 2 Under section 16C of chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General
Laws, the issuance of a liquor license could be prohibited if the applicant's

place of business was located within a 500-foot radius of an objecting church
or school. 3

The Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission

1. Grendel's Den is a restaurant located in the Harvard Square area of Cambridge, Massachusetts, a well-known business and entertainment area. Grendel's
Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 102, 103 (1st Cir. 1981) (en banc), arid sub noma,
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982). By its own admission, Grendel's
Den caters to a "quiche-and-salad crowd." Brief for Appellee at 3 n.3, Grendel'sDen,
103 S. Ct. at 505.
2. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 89, rev'd, 662 F.2d 102 (1st Cir.
1981) (en banc), a'd sub nom, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
Scorpio's, Inc., a holder of an all-alcoholic-beverages restaurant license, applied to
the Cambridge License Commission for approval to transfer its license to Grendel's
Den pursuant to a purchase agreement between the parties. Id. Notice of the proposed transfer was published in a local newspaper and mailed to all abutting property owners, and to any school, hospital, or church within a 500-foot radius of
Grendel's Den. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 138, § 15A (West 1974)).
Subsequently, the Cambridge License Commission denied the application for the
transfer of the license, citing as its reason a written objection filed by the Holy Cross
Armenian Catholic Church. Id.
Grendel's Den and the Holy Cross Church occupy buildings whose exterior rear
walls are 10 feet apart. 662 F.2d at 89. The objection filed by the Holy Cross Church
took the form of a letter written by its pastor which read in pertinent part as follows:
The Council of the Holy Cross Church and the parishioners unanimously
rejected in the past and again in the present, the idea of having so many
liquor licenses so near to our Church.
We already have plenty of noise, dirt, and abuse from Grendel's Den,
Inc.

We are kindly asking the Commission to reject the above License.
Holy Cross Church Council and myself-Pastor of Holy Cross Church personally-obect to the transfer of any liquor license to Grendel's Den.
Id. at 89 n. 1 (emphasis in original). The 500-foot radius surrounding Holy Cross
Church encompasses virtually the entire business and entertainment center of Cambridge known as Harvard Square. See Brief for Appellee at 6 n.6, Grendel'sDen, 103 S.
Ct. at 505. The radius surrounding Holy Cross Church covers roughly one million
square feet of the city's most commercially valuable sites. 662 F.2d at 105.
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1974). In its liquor zoning
laws, the Massachusetts legislature has delegated authority to local boards to prohibit
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(Beverages Control Commission) sustained the Cambridge License Commission's denial of the proposed liquor license solely on the basis of an objection
submitted by the Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Church (Holy Cross
Church), located ten feet from the restaurant. 4 Grendel's Den brought an
action against the state and city licensing commissions challenging the validity of section 16C under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, the establishment clause of the first amendment,
and the Sherman Act. 5 The district court, declining to follow a decision of
the distribution of liquor within certain areas of their community. Id. § 12. Section
12 provides that local authorities are authorized "to refuse to grant licenses under
[chapter 138] in certain geographical areas of their respective cities or towns, where
the character of the neighborhood may warrant such refusal." Id. The local licensing board itself is not prohibited from denying an application on the ground that the
proposed license situs is within the proximity of a church or school. Id.
Section 16C, at its inception, imposed an absolute ban on the licensing of premises for the sale of liquor located within 500 feet of a church or school. 1954 Mass.
Acts ch. 596, § 16C. The state began a progressive relaxation of the limitation by
modifying the statute to permit liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of a church or
school with the assent of the governing bodies of those institutions. See Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83, 88-89, 384 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1979).
In 1968, the legislature amended this categorical proscription to permit licensing
within the 500-foot radius "if the governing body of such church or school consents in
writing." 1968 Mass. Acts ch. 435.
In 1970, the present language was substituted, relieving the applicant of the
duty to gain the institution's assent and shifting the burden of formal objection to the
church or school. Amo, 377 Mass. at 88, 384 N.E.2d at 1226-27. Section 16C of
Chapter 138 of the Massachusetts General Laws provides in pertinent part as follows:
Premises, except those of an innholder and except such parts of buildings as are located ten or more floors above street level, located within a
radius of five hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for the
sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of such church or school
files written objection thereto, but this provision shall not apply to the
transfer of a license from premises located within said distance to other
premises located therein, if it is transferred to a location not less remote
from the nearest church or school than its former location.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1974).
Section 16C defines "church" as "a church or synagogue building dedicated to
divine worship and in regular use for that purpose, but not a chapel occupying a
minor portion of a building primarily devoted to other uses." Id. Finally, if an establishment sells liquor after one's license is disapproved, this constitutes a crime punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or up to one year's imprisonment. Id. § 2.
4. 662 F.2d at 88. The Beverages Control Commission is the state agency
charged with enforcing Massachusetts' liquor licensing regulations. Grendel's Den,
Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Mass. 1980).
5. 662 F.2d at 103. Grendel's Den asserted that section 16C violated federal
antitrust law by creating a licensing system which permits private parties to engage
in anti-competitive practices. 495 F. Supp. at 763 (citation omitted). Specifically,
Grendel's Den alleged that certain members of the Holy Cross Church were competitors of the plaintiff and that the church objected to the license in order to further the
commercial interests of those persons. Brief for Appellant at 7, Grendel's Den, 103 S.
Ct. at 505. The district court held that the state action exemption to the Sherman
Act would not bar relief under federal antitrust law. 495 F. Supp. at 770 (citing
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942)). The First Circuit agreed with the district
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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 6 held that the statute, on its
face, 7 violated the due process and establishment clauses of the Constitution. 8 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
initially reversed the district court.9 On rehearing, the same court, sitting en
banc, 10 affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment holding that
section 16C violated the principle of separation of church and state mancourt's antitrust analysis. 662 F.2d at 99-100. The en banc panel of the First Circuit
did not consider the antitrust issue. 103 S.Ct. at 508.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts defended the validity of section 16C
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment at each stage of the appellate proceedings thereby preserving this issue on appeal to the Supreme Court. See
C.A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 107 at 745 (West 4th ed. 1983).
See also Grendel's Den, 103 S. Ct. at 512 n.ll.

6. 495 F. Supp. at 765-66. The parties voluntarily suspended the district court
proceedings pending resolution of a state court challenge to the same statute by another liquor license applicant. d. at 763 (citing Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control
Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83, 384 N.E.2d 1223 (1979)).
In Amo, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the statute against both state and federal due process
and establishment clause challenges. Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n,
377 Mass. 83, 90-93, 384 N.E.2d 1223, 1228-29 (1979). Further, the court held that
"the legzslature's delegation in § 16Cofa veto power to the institutions most directly representing the interests it seeks to protect falls within permissible constitutional limits."
Id. at 89, 384 N.E.2d at 1227 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's pendant state claims,
alleging that the statute violated the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, were abandoned after the Arno decision was rendered. See Grendel'sDen, 495 F.
Supp. at 763 n.5.
7. Through a stipulation of contested claims, the parties agreed to present only
plaintiff's facial claims to the district court; the "as applied" constitutional claims as
well as the plaintiff's Sherman Act challenge remained open for further litigation

pending the outcome of the "as applied" claims. See 662 F.2d at 90 n.3.
8. 495 F. Supp. at 770. The district court first concluded that a state's right to
regulate liquor sales under the umbrella of the twenty-first amendment is subject to
limitation by other constitutional guarantees. 1d. at 764. The district court reasoned
that section 16C was an impermissible delegation of legislative power which violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 766 (citing Eubank v.
City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912)). For a discussion of Eubank, see notes 27-28
and accompanying text infra. The district court went on to hold that the statute
granted churches uncontrolled and standardless veto power which could be wielded
for the advancement of religion in violation of the establishment clause. 495 F. Supp.
at 767-68. The district court rejected plaintiff's equal protection claim. Id. at 768-69.
9. 662 F.2d at 88. The First Circuit panel, in a split decision, held that section
16C did not violate the due process clause, since it was "a reasonable means of regulation in an area where the states have wide latitude to regulate, and [was] not dissimilar to schemes commonly used in the fields of licensing and zoning." Id. at 95
(citations omitted). The court further opined that the statute did not violate the
establishment clause, since it did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
Id. at 96-99 (citations omitted).
10. 662 F.2d at 102. The case was first heard by Chief Circuit Judge Coffin,
Circuit Judge Campbell, and District Judge Hoffman of the Eastern District of Virginia sitting by designation. 662 F.2d at 89. The en bane panel was formed by substituting Circuit Judge Bownes for district Judge Hoffman. Chief Judge Coffin, who
dissented in the first panel decision, and Judge Campbell, who wrote the majority
opinion in that same decision, remained as members of the en banc panel. 662 F.2d at
102. On rehearing, Chief Judge Coffin wrote the majority opinion and Judge Campbell dissented. 662 F.2d at 103, 107.
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dated by the establishment clause."I The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holdtng that, despite the state's broad authority under the twenty-first
amendment, a delegation to churches and schools of the power to veto applications for liquor licenses violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).

Prior to the adoption of the twenty-first amendment, 12 the states had
broad power to regulate local distribution of liquor.' 3 Although this regula11. 662 F.2d at 107. Chief Judge Coffin, speaking for the majority, concluded
that section 16C had the primary or principal effect of advancing religions since, by
granting to churches "absolute discretion to confer or withhold an important commercial privilege," it effectively "distribute[d] benefits on an exphcIlty religious basis."
Id. at 105 (emphasis supplied by the Court). See generally id. at 104-06. Hence, the
First Circuit reasoned that the statute was "a law respecting an establishment of
religion" and, therefore, void under the Constitution. Id. at 104. Since the law was
determined to be constitutionally invalid, the court found it unnecessary to consider
the due process or antitrust arguments. Id. at 107 n. ll.
12. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2. "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id. The
twenty-first amendment was proposed by Congress on February 20, 1933 and was
proclaimed to be in effect on the fifth of December of that same year. E. CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 127 n.1, 448 (1975).
The Supreme Court and a majority of commentators consider section 2 of the
twenty-first amendment to be an affirmative grant of power to the states to protect
their citizens against the evils of liquor within their borders. See California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107 (1980); State Bd. of
Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936); Comment, The Effect of the
Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1578, 1579 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Authority to Control]; Comment, State Power
to Regulate Liquor: Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment, Reconsidered, 24 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1973); Note, Retail Price Maintenancefor Liquor.- Does the TwentyFirst Amendment Preclude a Free Trade Market?, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 507, 510
(1978). This first theory is labeled the "absolutist" approach and comports with Congressional debates over the effect of the twenty-first amendment. See 76 CONG. REC.
64-4172 (1933). A minority opinion, however, asserts that 'section 2 is a provision
which only allows the states to exercise their police power over alcohol while the
commodity is still in interstate commerce rather than in commerce within its own
boundaries. See Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 101819 (3d Cir. 1971); Comment, The Concept of State Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REV. 465, 471-73 (1973). This opposing interpretation of section 2
has been deemed the "federalist" position, which postulates that the twenty-first
amendment was enacted simply to prevent federal regulatory interference under the
commerce clause from unduly interfering with so-called "dry states" who wished to
keep alcohol without their borders. Authority to Control, supra at 1580.
13. See Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917). In Crane, the Supreme Court
stated:
It must now be regarded as settled that, on account of their well-known
noxious qualities and the extraordinary evils shown by experience commonly to be consequent upon their use, a State has power absolutely to
prohibit manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors within its borders without violating the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 307 (citations omitted). See generally Note, The Twenty-Fist Amendment Grants
States Plenary Power over the Liquor Industiy Notwithstanding the Dictates of the Equal Employment Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 Hous. L. REV. 587 (1971). Addi-
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tory power was considered incident to those powers reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment, 14 the Supreme Court in Caifornia v. LaRue 5 concluded that the twenty-first amendment conferred greater authority upon
the states than the general police power: it not only strengthened the states'
ability to regulate liquor distribution, but also added a presumption of valid16
ity to their regulation.
The states have exercised these tenth and twenty-first amendment powers to create zones of protection around valued institutions so they can be
insulated from liquor-serving establishments.' 7 Of these institutions, the
tional support for this statement is derived from the statement of Senator Blaine at
the time the proposed twenty-first amendment was being considered by the Senate:
"[Tihe State is not surrendering any power that it possesses, but rather, by reason of
this provision, in effect acquires power that it has not at this time." 76 CONG. REC.
4141 (1933).
From a historical perspective, regulation of the alcoholic beverage industry is as
old as the government itself. Smith, An Analysts of State Regulattons Governthg Liquor

Store Licenses, 25 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1982). Although control of liquor sales in the
United States dates back to the seventeenth century, regulatory control reached a
climax during the prohibition era of the nineteen-twenties. Id. Following the repeal
of prohibition, the then-existing forty-eight state legislatures rewrote their liquor regulations to reflect the general objective of protection of " 'the public health, safety,
peace, and morals.' " Id. (quoting Statutoiy Statement of Basic Purposes of Alcohoh Bever-

ages Law, Joint Committee of the States to Study Alcoholic Beverage Control: Administration, Licensing, Enforcement (1973)). Although the states' rationales for
regulation coincide, a government study reflects that each has enacted a unique combination of regulatory policies to accomplish this singular goal. Id.
14. See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156
(1919). For a discussion of the state's power to regulate the distribution of liquor, see
note 12, supra.
U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United

States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."
15. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion with
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall filing dissenting opinions.
16. d. at 114-15, 118. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980) (the twenty-first amendment in conjunction
with the police power encompasses "virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system"). The Supreme Court has subsequently recognized that states may prohibit
distribution absolutely or permit distribution only under explicit conditions. New
York State Liquor Auth. v. Beleanca, 101 S. Ct. 2599, 2601 (1981) (citations omitted). See also Connolly v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 334 Mass. 613, 619,
138 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1956) (incident to the authority wholly to prohibit the sale of
alcohol, the legislature may permit sales subject to prescribed terms and conditions).
17. Many jurisdictions either prohibit the sale of liquor within a prescribed distance from the protected institution or require the licensing authority to consider this
proximity in determining whether to grant a liquor license. For a discussion of the
various statutes which states have enacted to create zones of protection around valued institutions, see notes 19-23 and accompanying text infra. The primary objective
of these statutes is to remove the atmosphere created by a liquor-serving establishment a reasonable distance from institutions where the milieu of such places is considered inimical to the best interests and welfare of those attending such institutions.
45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 140, 585 (1969). For a discussion of the jurisdictions totally prohibiting liquor sales within a stated distance from protected institu-
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most frequently protected are churches and schools. 8 Religious and educational institutions, whose contribution to the public welfare is beyond dispute, are favored in zoning law and practice.' 9 The form of protection used
to insulate these institutions varies widely. Many jurisdictions prohibit the
issuance of a liquor license within a prescribed distance of protected institutions. 20 Some states direct the local licensing authority to consider the proximity of the proposed liquor outlet as a factor in deciding whether to grant a
tions, see note 19 and accompanying text znfra. For a discussion of the jurisdictions
which direct the local licensing authority to consider the proximity of the proposed
liquor outlet in deciding whether to grant a liquor permit, see note 20 and accompanying text, infra. For a discussion of those jurisdictions which permit a waiver of the
statutory ban on liquor sales within a prescribed distance of a protected institution, if
such institution gives consent or does not file an objection to the issuance of a proposed liquor license, see notes 21-22 and accompanying text, infra.
18. Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota are the only states which have not
specifically designated churches within their protection. But see COLO. REV. STAT.
12-47-138 (1973) (schools and seminaries); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.14 (West 1966)
(schools but allowing local governments power to protect churches); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 35-2-6.1 (1977 & 1979 Supp.) (schools but allowing local governments to protect

ANN.

churches). Institutions other than churches or schools may also be included. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 28-3-17 (1975) (all charitable institutions); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 127 (Smith-Hurd 1983 Supp.) (hospitals; homes for the aged, indigent, and veterans; and naval and military stations); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:280 (West 1975)
(libraries); MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-1-51 (1972 & 1982 Supp.) (funeral homes); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 125.68(3)(a) (West 1982) (hospitals).
19. See R. ANDERSON, 2 AMERICAN LAWS OF ZONING

§§ 12.17-.18 (2d ed.
1976). Courts have repeatedly emphasized the high purpose and moral value of religious and educational institutions. Id. § 12.18, at 442 & n.14. Further, religious uses
are looked upon most favorably since they are given protection under the establishment and free exercise clauses of both federal and state constitutions. Id. at 443.
Recognition of the contribution to the public welfare made by both religious and
educational uses is reflected in a Massachusetts statute which severely restricts the
degree of local zoning controlithat may be exercised over religious uses and nonprofit
educational uses. First enacted in 1950 in response to the perceived attempt by the
town of Dover, Massachusetts to discriminate against religious schools, the statute
was amended in 1975. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A § 3 (West 1976). For a
general history of the statute and its judicial interpretation, see Bible Speaks v. Board
of Appeals, 8 Mass. App. 19, 391 N.E.2d 279, 283 n.10 (1979).
20. Twenty-three states categorically ban, without possibility of waiver, the issuance of a liquor license within a prescribed distance of protected institutions. See
ALA. CODE § 28-3-17 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.410 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 48-345 (1977); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-138 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-21
(1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43 § 127 (Smith-Hurd 1983 Supp.); IND. CODE § 7.1-321-11) (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-710 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 46B, 47,
52A, 52B, 52C (1981 & 1982 Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.17a, 436.17c
(1978 & 1982 Supp.) (certain classes of licenses); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.14 (West
1972 & 1982 Supp.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-1-51 (1972 & 1982 Supp.); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 16--3-306 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-177 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 177:1 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-6B-10 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 534
(West 1982 supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-7-19 (1956 & 1981 Supp.); S.C. CODE § 61-3440 (1976); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 35-2-6.1 (1982 Supp.); W. VA. CODE § 11-16-12
(1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125-68 (West 1982 Supp.). Texas and Louisiana delegate
to cities and towns the authority to impose a total prohibition around protected institutions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-280 (West 1975); TEX. ALCO. BEv. CODE
ANN. § 109.33 (Vernon 1978).
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liquor license. 2 1 Still other states permit a waiver of the statutory restriction
on the sale of liquor within a proscribed distance of a protected institution if
such institution gives consent, 22 or does not file an objection to the issuance
of the proposed license. 2 3 These different statutory designs reflect diverse
community objectives as well as the flexible nature of land-use control and
24
zoning.
21. Eleven states have statutes directing the local licensing authority to refuse a
license if the proposed liquor outlet is in close proximity to a school, church or other
non-specified institutions. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23789 (West 1964); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-46 (West 1982 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 543 (1975 &
1982 Supp.); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-56 (1976); MiciH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§§ 436.17a, 436.17c (1978 & 1982 Supp.) (certain classes of licenses); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 18B-902 (1981 Supp.) (prohibition except if local board finds establishment a
suitable one); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.26 (Page 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47,
§§ 4-404, 4-432(d) (Purdon 1969 & 1983 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-5-105 (1982
Supp.); VA. CODE § 4-31 (1983); VT. ADMIN. COMP. LIQ. CONTROL BD. § 9139
(1976).
22. A common form of limitation in the issuance of various use permits is the

consent ordinance, which affords to the residents of a prescribed area in which a
troublesome use is proposed, an opportunity to prevent the issuance of a permit. See

R. ANDERSON, supra note 19 § 19.15 at 409. These ordinances may either prohibit
the use in issue unless a certain percentage of the owners within a specified distance
of the proposed use consent to the use, or alternatively, deprive the legislative body of
jurisdiction to issue a permit until written consents have been obtained by the applicant. See id. at 409-10. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-207(A) (1-3) (1982

Supp.) (prohibition unless assent by governing body of institution, local governing
body, and existing commercial zoning in area of proposed liquor outlet); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 301 (1964) (unanimous approval of members of local licensing
commission and written approval of majority of officers or person in charge of protected institution); Mo. REV. STAT. § 311.080 (1972) (consent in writing of governing
board of protected institution); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-76 (West 1940) (prohibition
except when waived by governing body of protected institution).
On the state level, the courts are generally divided as to the validity of such
legislation. See generally 101 C.J.S. Zoning §§ 255-56 (1958). Those jurisdictions which
invalidate consent provisions reason that such a statute is an arbitrary delegation of
legislative power. See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). For a
discussion of Eubank, see notes 27-28 and accompanying text infra. Those jurisdictions which have upheld use ordinances follow the contrary reasoning of Thomas
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). For a discussion of Cusack, see
notes 29-31 and accompanying text tnfra.
23. Massachusetts prohibits licensing of establishments within a certain proxim-

ity to protected institutions if the governing body of the institution files a written
objection thereto. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16c (West 1974). Other states
authorize local governmental bodies to control the distribution and placement of

liquor-serving establishments without specifically prohibiting the licensing of liquor
outlets within a prescribed distance of a protected institution. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 562.452 (1983 Supp.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.39 (West 1983 Supp.); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 201.280, 212. 160 (1979) (except prohibition of distribution within one mile

of on-going prayer meeting and within one-half mile of a state prison); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 5-02-09 (1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.1 et seq. (1981); Wvo. STAT. § 12-4101 (1977).

24. For two general statements justifying the use of the police power to impose
order on the development of a community through zoning legislation, see Gorieb v.
Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88

(1926). An excellent illustration of an accomodation for varying community values
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Some state courts have upheld statutes which condition the grant of a
liquor license on the consent of, or the absence of an objection by, residents
or property owners within a particular area in which the proposed establishment is to be operated. 2 5 Although the Supreme Court has never addressed
the issue of the propriety of delegating legislative authority under a liquor
licensing statute, it has analyzed statutes which have either permitted waivers of a legislative prohibition or which have imposed other types of use re26
strictions where consent of affected parties has been gained.
In Eubank v. City of Richmond,2 7 the Court considered the validity of a
city ordinance requiring municipal authorities to establish set-back lines for
buildings to be erected on any city block upon the request of the owners of
two-thirds of the abutting property. The Supreme Court invalidated the
City of Richmond's scheme as an unreasonable delegation of the police
power.2 8 In Cusack Co. v. City of Cht'cago ,29 the Court upheld a municipal
and needs is the Maryland statutory scheme which provides for various forms of
protection for churches and schools. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, §§ 46-53 (1981 &
1982 Supp.). For instance, in Baltimore, a statute permits churches and schools to
waive a 300-foot restriction. Id. § 46B. In Anne Arundel County, no license may be
issued within 1000 feet of a church or school. Id. § 46. In Dorchester County,
licenses are prohibited within 300 feet of a church or school. Id. § 50. In Queen
Anne's County, no license can issue within 500 feet of a church, school, library, or
youth center. Id. § 52C. These diverse methods of location control in land-use planning are not dissimilar to schemes commonly used in the fields of licensing and zoning. See, e.g., O'Brien v. St. Paul, 285 Minn. 378, 173 N.W.2d 462 (1969); Robwood
Advertising Assocs. v. Nashua, 102 N.H. 215, 153 A.2d 787 (1959). For example,
states have combined use of both distance requirements and consent provisions in the
context of gasoline station regulation. See Note, Location Control of Gasohne Servtce Statins, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 66, 69-70 (1960). Although gasoline stations are neces-

sary and lawful enterprises, like liquor outlets, their character is such that reasonable
limitation and regulation as to location and use is within the settled principles of the
police power. See id. at 69.
25. See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 156, 598-99 (1969); 48
CJ.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 96, 449-54 (1981). See also Davis v. Blount County Beer
Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 151-53 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding ordinance which prohibited
liquor licenses within 300 feet of a residential dwelling if the owner of the residence
objects); Wiles v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 59 Mich. App. 321, 229
N.W.2d 434 (1975) (statute denying liquor license if proposed location is within 500
feet of church and church files objection thereto upheld against attack alleging unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and violation of the establishment
clause); Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279 Ky. 468, 131 S.W.2d 446 (1939) (upholding a
statute which prohibited the issuance of a liquor license within 200 feet of a nonconsenting church, school, or hospital). One author has suggested that courts have generally upheld even those consent requirements which wholly lack standards or
guidelines when the proposed use is offensive to the community. See A. RATHKOPF,
THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 29.04, 29.6-29.8 (rev. 3d ed. 1966). See also
L. Jaffe, Law-Makzng B)' Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201, 227 (1937).
26. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. City
of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). For a discussion of Cusack, Eubank and Roberge, see
notes 27-36 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the use of consent provisions in land-use control, see note 22 supra.
27. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
28. Id. at 144. The Virginia statute authorized municipalities to enact building
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ordinance which absolutely prohibited the erection of any billboard in designated city blocks, but permitted modification of this prohibition with the
consent of those individuals most affected by such modification. 30 Distinguishing Eubank, the Court in Cusack stated that the billboard modification
was "not a delegation of legislative power, but . . . a familiar provision affecting the enforcement of laws and ordinances. ' 3 1 Subsequently, in Washinglon ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 32 the Court invalidated a city
zoning scheme which conditioned the issuance of a building permit for a
home for the elderly on the consent of two-thirds of the property owners
within 400 feet of the proposed building. 33 The Roberge Court limited Cusack
regulations, including the establishment of building lines. Id. at 140-41. Pursuant to
this act, the Richmond City Council passed an ordinance stating that owners of twothirds of property abutting any street could conclusively establish set-back lines,
within prescribed limits, by filing a written request. Id. at 141. Such action triggered
the licensing committee's refusal to grant any building permit which would allow
construction outside the established lines. Id. The Court concluded that the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of the police power because "it [was] hard to
understand how the public comfort or convenience, much less the public health,
[could] be promoted by a line which may be so variously disposed." Id. at 144.
Hence, the Court concluded that the consent provision contained in the Virginia
statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legisli.tive authority. Id. Further, Justice McKenna reasoned that non-assenting property owners on abutting streets are
denied due process of law since the ordinance leaves discretion not in the administrative agency but in two-thirds of the abutting property owners. Id. at 143-44. Hence,
the consent provision in the Virginia statute was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
29. 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
30. Id. at 527-28, 531. The Chicago ordinance provided in pertinent part as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to erect or construct any billboard or signboard in any block on any public street in which
one-half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for
residence purposes without first obtaining the consent in writing of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a majority of the frontage of the property on both sides of the street in the block in which such
billboard or signboard is to be erected, constructed or located ....
Id. at 527-28.
The Court first observed that the regulation and control over the construction
and maintenance of billboards was a legitimate exercise of the police power. Id. at
529-30. It then concluded that the ordinance created an absolute ban on the erection
or construction of billboards, but permitted one-half of the lot owners to remove
these restrictions. Id. at 531. Since the legislature had made a decision to ban all
billboard construction unless a percentage of the landowners consented to a waiver of
this legislative mandate, Justice Clarke reasoned that the statute did not effectively
delegate legislative power. Id.
31. Id. The Cusack Court stated that the ordinance in Eubank left the establishment of building requirements to the action of neighboring lot owners, making the
administrative body merely the "automatic register" of this private action, but giving
it the effect of law. Id. While the Eubank ordinance permitted two-thirds of the
adjacent lot owners to impose restrictions upon adjoining property owners, the Cusack
statute permitted one-half of the lot owners to remove restrici'onson the property owners. Id.
32. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
33. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 122-23. The Seattle ordinance provided that: "[a] phil-
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to cases involving offensive uses or nuisances which tend to cause injury or
inconvenience to the community. 34 Since a philanthropic home was not
such a use, the attempted delegation of uncontrolled discretion to neighbor35
hood landowners could not be sustained.
The distinction drawn in this trilogy of cases is thought by commentators to be clear: if the action or inaction of property owners had the effect of
creating a restriction on offensive uses or nuisances, then it has the effect of
legislation and constitutes an unlawful delegation of power; on the other
hand, if the prohibition is imposed by the legislative body, and the consents
merely waive or modify a restriction which the legislature has created, then
36
the law is valid.
Although zoning legislation pursuant to the police power has been accorded great judicial deference, 37 the Supreme Court has required heightened judicial scrutiny when a statutory provision infringes upon a
anthropic home for children or for old people shall be permitted in [a certain established "First Residence District"] when the written consent shall be obtained of the
owners of two-thirds of the property within (400) feet of the proposed building." Id.
at 118.
34. Id. at 122. In contrast to the ordinances in Eubank and the present case, the
Court explained, the prohibition in Cusack was based on "facts found [which] were
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that . . .billboards would or were liable to endanger the safety and decency of [residential] districts." Id. There had been no legislative findings that the proposed building would cause any injury to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Id. at 121. On the contrary, "[t]he grant of
permission for such building and use . . . shows that the legislative body found that
the construction and maintenance of a new home was in harmony with the public
interest and with the general scope and plan of the zoning ordinance." Id. This
distinguished the proposed use from "billboards or other uses which by reason of
their nature are liable to be offensive" to the community. Id. at 122.
35. Id. at 121-23. Justice Butler found that there was "no provision for review
under the ordinance; [two-thirds of the abutting property owners'] failure to give
consent is final." Id. at 122. Further, the Court reasoned that the property owners
were "free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the
trustee to their will or caprice." Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366,
368 (1886) (systematic exercise of laundry-licensing authority to discriminate against
persons of oriental extraction violates equal protection)).
36. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 25 § 29.02, at 29-4. The total prohibition of a use
may be validly modified with the consent of those most affected by the modification;
however, an actual delegation of legislative power is invalid. See Roberge, 278 U.S. at
122. However, where there is a modification and not a delegation, the use to which
the property is put is important. Id. at 122. If the use involves a potential nuisance,
the courts are apt to validate the consent requirement. Id. See, e.g., Valkanet v. City
of Chicago, 13 Ill. 2d 268, 272, 148 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1958) (citing Cusack, 242 U.S. at
526) (approving prohibition which might be waived by consent of adjoining landowners where statutory provision deals with uses the location of which have a "strong
tendency to injure the public health or morals or affect the general welfare, and have
the general characteristic of a nuisance, such as saloons").
37. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that zoning may be the most important function performed by local government, "for it is the primary means by which we protect that
sometimes difficult to define concept of quality of life." Id. (citing Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). He went on to state that the police power which
provides the justification for zoning is not to be narrowly confined. Rather, the
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fundamental constitutional right. 38 Furthermore, regardless of whether a
state legislates under the tenth amendment police power or the more specific
power to regulate the sale and use of liquor under the twenty-first amendment, that power may not be exercised in a manner which abridges the free39
doms guaranteed by the first amendment.
The first amendment commands that there shall be "no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Court should afford zoning authorities wide latitude in choosing the means by which

to implement such purposes. Id. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. Id. Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted that although the Court should afford
zoning authorities wide latitude, "deference does not mean abdication." Id. Rather,
he stated, the Court has an obligation to ensure that zoning ordinances, even when
adopted in furtherance of such legitimate aims, do not infringe upon fundamental
rights. Id. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Zoning and land-use control law must be considerative of our constitutional system of protection of individual liberties and of limits against paternalistic overreaching of government in ordering the lives of individual citizens. See A. RATHKOPF,
supra note 25 § 17B.01, at 17B-3-17B-4. A state's exercise of the police power is
constitutional where fundamental freedoms are not implicated or where state interest
is stronger than the opposing interest. Comment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious
Conduct, andthe Free Exerctse of Re/igion, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 786, 807 (1981). A review-

ing court should balance the state's interest in zoning against the fundamental right,
thereby not limiting its review to abuse of discretion. See id.
39. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 125 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). See, e.g., Young v. American
Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), on remand, American Mini-Theatres, Inc. v.
Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975). In American Mini-Theatres, the Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, upheld a zoning ordinance which placed narrow limits on the locations in which adult theatres and other sexually-oriented enterprises were permitted
to operate within a municipality. Id. at 72-73. The Court, however, ruled that the
first amendment restricted the municipality from using its police power in such a way
as to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its contents. See id. See also Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (government power to zone must give way when it infringes upon freedom of expression).
Since 1964, the Supreme Court has also significantly narrowed the scope of state
power under the twenty-first amendment. The Supreme Court has held that the
twenty-first amendment does not necessarily protect state liquor regulations from
constitutional attack. Comment, Pre-EmptingState Action Taken Pursuantto the TwentyFirst Amendment , 53 TEMP. L.Q. 590, 603-07 (1980). See,e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.

190, 206-209 (1976) (state law setting lower drinking age for females than for males
violates equal protection notwithstanding twenty-first amendment); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971) (state power to decide who may consume
alcoholic beverages is subject to procedural due process requirements of notice and
hearing); Department of Revenue v. James Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964)
(states cannot tax imported liquor in violation of the import-export clause notwithstanding twenty-first amendment). Cf. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1980) (twenty-first amendment did not
"repeal" the commerce clause and must be reconciled with that clause's negative
implications).
For a discussion of the states' power to legislate pursuant to the tenth or twentyfirst amendments, see notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or
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The religion clauses are thought to encompass a unitary guarantee of separation and freedom; that is, separation guarantees freedom and freedom requires separation. 4 1 Although the Supreme Court appears to regard these
clauses as expressing a single policy consideration of separation, 42 the dual
nature of the clauses has led the Court to mandate that government chart a
neutral course between avoiding involvement with religion and intervening
43
when necessary to insure religious free exercise.
The tension between the two clauses is highlighted in the struggle the
Court has faced in interpreting the establishment clause. 4 4 The struggle of
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances.
The establishment clause of the first amendment was made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(free exercise clause applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment). See also
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation. The ConstitutionalDilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 564 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Freedom or Separation].

Under this theory, separation and freedom are not considered as separate concepts or
principles, but rather, as two sides of a single coin. L. PFEFFER, The Casefor Separation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 52, 60 U. Cogley ed. 1958). Viewed from a historical
perspective, the tradition of the founding fathers does not merit an apportionment of
values between disestablishment and freedom. Freedom or Separation, supra at 564.
Support for a conclusion that freedom and separation were intended to meld
into a unitary concept derives from the views of Roger Williams and James Madison.
See id. Roger Williams opposed government enforcement of religious uniformity for
the very reason that it "confounds the Civil and Religious." Williams, The Bloody
Tenent of Persecutionfor Cause of Conscience, Discussed, in a Conference between Truth and
Peace (1644), reprinted in 3 PUBLICATIONS OF THE NARRAGANSETT CLUB 3-4 (S. Cald-

well ed. 1867). Madison, in opposing a bill which would have established a provision
for teachers of the Christian religion, stated that religion must be directed by individual reason and conviction, not mandated by government force or violence. J.
MADISON,

MEMORIAL

AND

REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

RELIGIOUS

ASSESSMENTS

(1785) (quoting Declaration of Rights, art. 16), reprintedin Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1947) (appendix to Rutledge, J., dissenting).
42. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Reltgion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27

U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195, 1215 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Entanglement Test]. See
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Justice
Rutledge reasoned that " '[e]stablishment' and 'free' exercise [are] correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and fundamental
freedom." Id.
However, in its attempt to reconcile the demands that government neither favor
nor abridge the practice of religion, the Court has subjected challenged practices to
independent analysis under each clause and adopted separate tests for each clause.
W. D. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 109 (1980).
43. Walz v.Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-70 (1970). See J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J.

YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

849 (1978).

For a dis-

cussion of the confrontation between the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause of the first amendment, see notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
44. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Wa/z, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[i]n attempting to articulate the scope of the two religion clauses, the
Court's opinions have reflected the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 668. Further, inconsistency of the Court's opinion has, in turn, resulted from the Court's fear against casting the two clauses in
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45
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson against the Virginia Assessment Bill
engendered two theories regarding the intention and meaning of this
clause. 46 According to one theory, the clause bans the preferential treatment
of any particular religion or sect by the government. 4 7 A second theory, as

absolute terms. See id. If each clause were expanded to a logical extreme, it would
tend to clash with the other. Id. at 668-69.
Apart from the confrontation between the two religion clauses which must be
overcome when interpreting the establishment clause, the Court faced the uncertainty exhibited by the framers' drafts of the first amendment. The breadth of the
establishment clause is apparent when the proposed alternative versions of the first
amendment which were rejected by the Senate, are compared with the final version.
There were two proposed versions. One provided, "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed." FIRST SESSION OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 70 (September 3, 1789). The other provided, "Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination or religion in preference to another; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the right of
conscience be infringed." Id. But see J. BRADY, CONFUSION TWICE CONFOUNDED 89 (2d ed. 1955) (the men who drafted and adopted the first amendment understood
establishment of religion to mean "the recognition of one religion by the state in
preference to all others, and the according to that one [religion] of special privileges
not shared by others.").
45. The Virginia Assessment Bill, a taxing measure for the support of religion,
was designed to revive the payment of tithes, a practice which had been suspended
since 1777. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 36 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Madison delivered his Memorial and Remonstrance to the Virginia Assembly in
1785 proclaiming that "[tihe religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these
may dictate." See J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprntedin Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-71. Madison's protest precipitated the demise of the Assessment Bill. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 37-39 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Further, it laid the foundation for the enactment of Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. See id. at 28-44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See also 11
JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS 428-30 (Monticello ed. 1905).
46. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 36 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Cf.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816-17 (1978). Professor Tribe suggests
that there are not two, but three distinct schools of thought concerning the relations
between church and state. The first, held by Roger Williams, is that separation provides a vehicle for protecting the church from excesses of the state. The second is the
Jeffersonian view that churches should be walled off from the state in order to protect
the state from the influence of the church. Finally, Professor Tribe suggests that yet a
third view is represented by Madison's assertion that both religious and secular interests would be best advanced by decentralizing power so as to assure competition
among sects rather than dominance by one over another. Id.
47. E. CORWIN, supra note 12, at 269. This theory was supported in the abstract
by Justice Story, who, although he interpreted the clause as banning the preferential
treatment of a particular religion over another, regarded Congress as still free to prefer the Christian religion over other religions. Id. (citing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION, II §§ 1870-1879 (Cambridge, Mass. 1833)). It was also supported by legal scholar Thomas M. Cooley in his treatise on the principles of constitutional law, where he states that the establishment clause prohibits "the setting up
or recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special
favors and advantages which are denied to others." Id. (t'itg T. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224-25 (Little, Brown, ed. 1874)).
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voiced by Thomas Jefferson, asserts that it was the purpose of the first
amendment to build "a wall of separation between church and State."' 48
Almost one hundred years after the adoption of the first amendment, the
Supreme Court, acknowledging Jefferson as the "leader of the advocates of
measure," accepted the concept of a wall of separation as an almost authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the establishment clause. 49 The
Court, however, has not interpreted the establishment clause as requiring a
"wall" of separation between church and state;50 rather, it has drawn a
48. E. CORWIN, supra note 12, at 270. This theory was first voiced in 1802 by
Thomas Jefferson in a reply letter which he wrote to a group of Baptists in Danbury,
Connecticut. Id. Jefferson occasioned to say,
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship;
that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not
opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should make no law
respecting an establishment of religion . . . ; thus buildtg a wall ofseparation
between church and State.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting 8 WORKS OF THOMAS
113 (Washington ed. 1861)) (emphasis added). However, just three years
after the Danbury letter, Jefferson appeared to have further contemplated the purpose of the first amendment: "In matters of religion, I have considered that its free
exercise is placed by the Constitution independent of the powers of the general gov-

JEFFERSON

ernment." Second Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in

J.

D. RICHARDSON,

A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, I 379 (Washington 1900).
49. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). In Reynolds, the Court
addressed the issue of whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification for an
overt act made criminal by the laws of the United States. Id. at 162. The defendant
was a member of the Mormon Church. Id. at 161. The federal government challenged a member's right to practice church-sanctioned polygamy, a practice forbidden by federal law. Id. In addressing the issue of the free exercise of religion, the
Court reasoned that Jefferson's letter left the government free to reach actions "in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order." Id. at 164. Thus, gaining its
support from the language of Jefferson, the unanimous Court sustained the right of
Congress to forbid polygamy in the territories of the United States. Id. at 167. Although the Court spoke with approval of the Jefferson letter, it is submitted that the
Court specifically addressed the issue of Congressional power to restrain the free exercise of religion and not the concept of a wall of separation between church and state.
See id.

50. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). A complete separation of
church and state "is not possible in an absolute sense." Id. Rather, the line of separation "is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances
of a particular relationship." Id. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (the Court avoids "categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either end of the range of possible outcomes."). Cf.
Abington School Dist. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) ("this Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another.
) (emphasis added); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 18 (1947) (the first amendment wall between church and
state must be kept high and impregnable).
The view that absolute separation of church and state is not required by the first
amendment is shared by such notable scholars as Erwin Griswold, former Dean of
the Harvard Law School, Edwin S. Corwin, Paul Kauper, and Wilbur Katz. Freedom
or Separation, supra note 41, at 567. The principle of church-state separation, accord-
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penetrable barrier to accommodate inevitable interaction and yet to afford
protection against the "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 5 1
The modern era of the doctrine of separation of church and state as a
genre of constitutional law began with the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. BoardofEducation. 52 Everson's implicit scrutiny of the purpose and effect
of state aid to religious institutions in determining the constitutional validity
of the aid eventually developed into an explicit test. 53 The Court, in Lemon v.
Kurlzman,54 established the current tripartite test for determining the constitutionality of government action under the establishment clause. 55 First,
ing to these scholars, is an instrumental principle: separation will generally promote
religious freedom; "it is defensible so long as it does so, and only so long." Id.
51. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). This description of prohibited governmental activity has been reiterated by the Court in recent cases. See, e.g.,
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (the fundamental question is whether the particular church-state relationship furthers any of
the evils against which the establishment clause is designed to protect). Two schools
of thought have developed concerning what form of governmental aid to religious
organization is sufficient to violate the separation of church and state mandated by
the establishment clause. The "separationists" argue "that the establishment clause
forbids Congress to provide any form of economic assistance whatever to religious or
religiously affiliated organizations." P. WEBER & D. GILBERT, PRIVATE CHURCHES
AND PUBLIC MONEY xii (1981) (citations omitted). A second classical school of
thought, "the accomodationists," argues that economic aid may be given to religious
institutions if it is shared equitably and does not favor one religious group over another. Id. at xiv. The focus of the first amendment prohibition, the accomodationists
argue, "is not aid, but privilege, coercion, and civil disabilities based on religious
belief or practice." Id. (citations omitted).
52. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See T. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION 18-20 (1976).
Between 1790 and 1945 the Supreme Court had decided only three cases "touching
in any substantial way on church-state relationships." Id. at 8.
53. In Everson, the Court upheld the expenditure of tax revenues to provide bus
transportation to students of Catholic as well as public schools against due process
and establishment clause challenges. 330 U.S. at 5-8, 15-18. While declaring that an
impregnable wall between church and state had been erected by the first amendment, the Court nonetheless recognized that an incidental benefit to religion would
not invalidate reh ously neutrallegislation with a polz~e power purpose, i e. "to help parents
get their children regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools." d. at 18. Everson's focus on the purpose and effect of the legislation foreshadowed the modern three-tiered establishment clause test discussed at
notes 55-58 and accompanying text in/ra.
54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved a Rhode Island legislative program
which supplemented the salaries of teachers in certain non-public schools and a similar Pennsylvania program which reimbursed non-public schools for various costs incurred in teaching specified secular subjects. Id. at 606-07.
55. Id. at 612-13. This test has been reaffirmed in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). For a discussion of
the genesis and development of the Court's tripartite test, see Note, Property Tax Exemption for Religiously Owned Property Used Solely for Rehgious PurposesHeld Not Volat've of

the Rel&ious Clauses of the First Amendment, 16 VILL. L. REV. 374 (1970).
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"the statute must have a secular legislative purpose"; 56 second, "its principal
57
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion";
and finally, it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion." ' 58 The Lemon Court held that a finding of any of these considerations would be independently sufficient to render legislative fiat unconstitutional. 59 The Lemon test has been applied by the Supreme Court to strike
56. 403 U.S. at 612. The Court was willing to accept the statement of purpose
offered by both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania: "[t]o enhance the quality of the
secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Id. at
613.
57. Id. at 612. The Court did not decide whether the effect of the legislative
programs would violate the establishment clause, because it relied on the defect of
excessive entanglement, the third prong of the test. Id. at 613-14. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 43, at 854. The authors view the Court's discussion as indicating that it would have found a prohibited effect in these programs had
it analyzed the case under this prong of the Lemon test. Id.
This second prong of the Lemon test demonstrates the polar forces tugging at the
Court's shirttails. Advancing religion constitutes establishment, but inhibithng religion
means prohibiting its free exercise, which the Court has held, also constitutes a violation of the separation of church and state. Freedom or Separation, supra note 41, at 566
(citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15).
58. 403 U.S. at 613. "In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Id. at
615. The Court believed that the program's requirement that the government inspect the schools' financial records to determine which expenditures were religious
would constitute "an intimate and continuing relation between church and state."
Id. at 620-22.
The "excessive entanglement" concept is thought to introduce into religion
clause jurisprudence a "prophylactic dimension." The Entanglement Test, supra note
42, at 1200. "Administrative relationships between religious and civil authorities are

forbidden not only when they result in government support or direction of religious
enterprises but also when they are 'pregnant with dangers of excessive government
direction' of such enterprises." d. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620). In attempting
to reduce potential church-state strife, relationships which might cause religiouslybased disputes are forbidden regardless of whether any real friction between the
church and state is present. Id. at 1201. Further, a secondary role for "excessive

entanglement" is to act as an early warning system for more traditional establishment clause hurdles, such as the question of primary effect. Id. at 1203 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798).
Commentators have suggested that the entanglement inquiry may have a second
aspect; that is, the Court must examine for and invalidate any aid program which
causes an undue amount of political division along religious lines. J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 43, at 854-55. Whether this second inquiry under
the entanglement test is to be considered a fourth element of the Lemon test is an issue
for debate. Id. at 855.
59. 403 U.S. at 613. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 168
(197 1); Note, State Aid to Nonpublc Elementary and Secondary Schools Held Violative of the
Estabhshment Clause of the First Amendment, 17 VILL. L. REV. 574, 581 (1972). It has
been suggested that the latter two prongs are both "effects" tests; the former focuses
on the effects of the legislation on religion, while the latter focuses upon the effects of
the legislation on the relationship existing between church and state. Id. at 581. The
relationship between the second and third phases of the test appear "to be such that
where the degree of advancement of religion is slight and subordinate, a greater de-
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down or uphold legislation in various arenas of conflict: tax exemption, 60
aid to parochial schools or institutions, 6 ' sabbatarian exemptions, 62 religious
65
64
63
tests for public office, conscientious objector status, and school prayer.
gree of entanglement would be justified." Id. at 581 n.52. On the other hand, where
the advancement of religion is significant and substantial, a significantly lesser degree
of entanglement would be sufficient to render a program unconstitutional. Id.
60. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Wa/z, the Court was called
upon to determine the constitutionality of exempting church properties from real
estate taxation. Id. at 666-67. The plaintiff had claimed that the exemption had
both the purpose and effect of aiding religion, therein violating the establishment
clause. Id. The Court upheld the law on the ground that exemption rather than
taxation of church properties more effectively served the purpose of avoiding excessive church-state entanglement. Id. at 674-75.
61. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding New York statute involving reimbursement to nonpublic
schools for reporting attendance and grading state-prepared tests).
To summarize the status of the law respecting church-related educational institutions, there is no constitutional barrier to the supply of health, nutritional, and
similar therapeutic and remedial services. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. It is
permissible to finance school transportation. See id. at 16-17. Further, it is permissible to loan secular textbooks only at the elementary and secondary school levels. See,
e.g., Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
However, the scope of permissible governmental financing is broader at the college or
university level. See e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding non-categorigal grants to church-affiliated colleges for non-sectarian purposes); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding issuance of public bonds to
finance construction of non-sectarian facilities by church-affiliated colleges); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding public construction grants to churchaffiliated colleges for non-sectarian purposes).
62. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In the so-called "Sunday Closing Laws" cases, the Supreme Court found that laws proscribing certain business
activities on Sundays were not necessarily based on religion and, hence, were not laws
"respecting an establishment of religion." See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445. The
Court reasoned that such laws had become an inherent part of an effort to improve
the health, safety and general well-being of this country's citizens, wholly apart from
its original genesis in religion. Id. The Court stated that to strike down such laws
would be to give a "constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare
rather than one of mere separation of church and state." Id. The Court also held
that such a law did not violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. at
453. The Court two years later, however, did hold that it was a violation of the free
exercise clause to deny employment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist who
would not accept an available position that would require her to work on Saturdays.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
63. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). In McDanel, a defeated candidate
in a state election for delegees to a convention to revise the Tennessee state constitution challenged a state provision barring clergy from holding public office. Id. at
620-21. The losing candidate challenged the qualification of the victor because he
was an ordained minister. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Tennessee law
violated both the free exercise and establishment clauses. See id. at 636 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
64. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-57 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Welsh, Justice Harlan described the issue in the case as whether a statute
which defers to an individual's views emanating from adherence to theistic religious
beliefs is within the power of Congress. Id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring). He stated
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Piercing through the veil of confusion created by the Supreme Court's
case-by-case analysis of establishment clause challenges, 66 the Court has
demonstrated greater willingness to review challenges brought under the establishment clause than it has toward challenges brought under other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 67 The Court has, in the process of requiring the
government to maintain a "benevolent neutrality" to protect these individual rights, set itself in a direction of much closer relations between church
that in order to pass muster, such a statute, having chosen to exempt, cannot draw
the line between theistic and nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular
beliefs on the other hand, for such distinctions are not compatible with the neutrality
mandated by the establishment clause. Id.
65. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the Supreme Court
invalidated a New York law allowing state officials to compose a prayer and require
that it be recited each school day notwithstanding the fact that the prayer was nondenominational and pupils who did not want to participate could be excused. 370
U.S. at 425-26. Stated Justice Black,
It is neither sacreligious nor antireligious to say that each separate government . . . should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave purely religious function to the people themselves
and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.
Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
One year later, the Court struck down, as violative of the establishment clause, a
Pennsylvania law permitting state officials to require a reading from the Bible or a
recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 22627. The Court did not, however, talk in absolutes. Should study of the Bible or
religion be presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, the Court
reasoned that it would comport with the principles of the first amendment. Id. at
225.
66. E. CORWIN, supra note 12, at 267. For a discussion of the Court's own view
that it has eschewed a straight and logical path in the area of separation, see note 44
supra.

One rationale for the inconsistency in the establishment clause decisions is the
variation among the personal biases of the Justices. See Boles, Church and State and the
Burger Court.- Recent Developments Affecting ParochialSchools, 18 J. CHURCH & STATE 21,
29 (1976). The traditional conservative line-up of Justices Powell, Blackmun, Burger,
White and Rehnquist has broken down on church-state issues particularly with regard to governmental aid to religious-affiliated schools. Id. One author has suggested that Justices White, an Episcopalian, and Rehnquist, a Lutheran, reveal a
clear pattern of support for such aid, with Chief Justice Burger, a Methodist, occasionally joining their position. Id. For a detailed discussion of the breakdown of the
opinions of the Justices in the 1972-73 term of the Court, see COMMISSION ON LAW,
SOCIAL ACTION AND URBAN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT FOR THE

1972-73

TERM:

A

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

97-98 (1973).

67. Boles, supra note 66, at 27. In the two decades preceding the appointment of
the Nixon Court, the Warren Court averaged 71.7 percent of its decisions in favor of
an asserted civil or constitutional right. Id. at 25. The Burger Court's swing away
from the Warren Court's liberal position is indicated by a 50.8 percent figure. Id.
The Burger Court has halted the broadening of the bounds of such constitutional
guarantees of freedom and equality which characterized the Warren Court. Id. at 26.
However, under the leadership of Chief Justice Burger, the Court has devoted a high
proportion of its time to resolving civil liberties issues whether decided favorably towards the individual asserting the protection or not. .d. Although the Court could
turn its back on those seeking protection of basic liberties through the simple expedient of refusing to accept appeals in cases of this kind, it has not done so. Id.
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68

and state.
Against this background, the Grendel's Den Court 69 commenced its analysis by recognizing the power of a state to protect the environment around
70
Furcertain institutions through the exercise of reasonable zoning laws.
ther, the Court noted that judicial deference to the exercise of zoning powers
in the area of liquor regulation is particularly appropriate in light of the
71
The majority
states' extensive powers under the twenty-first amendment.
it
delegated to
because
statute,
Massachusetts
the
cautioned, however, that
was
applications,
license
liquor
certain
religious entities the power to veto
72
judgment.
zoning
legislative
a
by
warranted
deference
judicial
the
not due
Where the exercise of a state's power to zone pursuant to the tenth or
twenty-first amendments impinges upon the guarantees of the establishment
73
clause, the Court reasoned that the former must give way to the latter.
68. E. CORWIN,supra note 12, at 267. Corwin noted that this is particularly true
where the state is acting to aid a religious institution. Id.Another author, however,
has criticized the Lemon test's failure to keep abreast of the ever-increasing interplay
between church and state. See The Entanglement Test, supra note 42, at 1238. These

contrasting views are indicative of the impossible task of predicting a conclusion to a
violatile problem involving "a seamless web of law, politics, religious and educational
philosophy, and economics." Boles, supra note 66, at 38.
69. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, Marshall, White, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion.
70. 103 S.Ct. at 509. The Court noted that it had previously upheld, as reasonable zoning ordinances, the regulation of the location of "adult theatres" and the
prohibition of willful noise-making while disturbing to the good order of a school. Id.
(citing Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). For a discussion of Amerlcan Mini- Theatres,
see note 39 supra.
The Court also recognized that states have long employed zoning laws to regulate the environment of churches and schools by insulating them from commercial
establishments which serve liquor. Id. at 4026-27. See notes 20-23 and accompanying
text supra.
71. 103 S. Ct. at 509 (citing California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-10 (1980); Califorma v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109). For a
discussion of LaRue, see note 15 supra. The majority affirmed its prior rulings that
courts should refrain from reviewing the merits of a governmental zoning decision,
unless it is shown to be arbitrary or irrational. Id. (citing Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974)).
72. Id. (citing Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83, 89,
384 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1979)). The Court based its conclusion that the statute delegated veto power to private institutions on the most recent construction of the statute
by the highest Massachusetts court. Id. at 509-10 & n.4 (citing Arno, 377 Mass. at 83,
384 N.E.2d at 1223). See also O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974) (implying
that highest state court's interpretation of state statute is controlling upon other
court's subsequent interpretation of that statute).
The majority noted that a state, as opposed to any private entity, is the repository of twenty-first amendment power. Id. at 509-10 (quoting Calforma v. LaRue, 409
U.S. at 116). However, the Court declined to decide whether, or upon what conditions, the twenty-first amendment power may ever be delegated to non-governmental
entities. Id. at 510.
73. See 103 S.Ct. at 510 n.5. For a discussion of the heightened level of judicial
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The Court, referring to Thomas Jefferson's concept of a wall of separation,14 then explained that the establishment clause grew out of a belief that
religion and government must be insulated from each other in order to coexist. 7 5 Although a limited degree of entanglement is inevitable in a modern
society, the Court viewed the vesting of a discretionary governmental power
76
in a religious body as a substantial breach of that wall.
Next, the Court turned to an analysis of this "breach" under the Lemon
test. It acknowledged that section 16C had a valid secular purpose, thus
satisfying the first requirement under Lemon .77 However, the Court characterized the effect of the section as an advancement of religion because the
standardless delegation of a veto power empowered churches to promote ex78
a result proscribed by the second prong of the Lemon
plicitly religious goals,
79
Moreover, the Court noted that "the mere appearance of a joint exertest.
cise of Legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power
80
conferred."
scrutiny which a court employs when a statutory provision infringes upon a fundamental right, see notes 37-39 & 91 supra.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 510. The Court asserted that the two purposes of the establishment clause were "to foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths,
and to foreclose the establishment of a state religion familiar in other Eighteenth
Century systems." Id.
75. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association (January 1, 1802), reprinted in 8 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113
(Washington ed. 1861))). For a discussion of the Jeffersonian concept of a wall of
separation between church and state, see notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 510.
77. Id. at 510-11. The district court had characterized the legislative purpose as
"protecting spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'hurly-burly' associated with liquor outlets." 495 F. Supp. at 766. The Supreme Court noted that although the statute embraced a valid secular purpose, the law's effectiveness was
questionable in light of the fact that at the time the law was enacted, 26 liquor outlets surrounded the Holy Cross Church. 103 S. Ct. at 510 n.6. Further, the Court
reasoned, the statute's purpose could be accomplished by other means-for instance,
banning liquor outlets within a reasonable distance from designated institutions or
ensuring a hearing at licensing proceedings where such affected institutions may
voice their views. Id. at 510-11 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Lemon test,
see notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
78. 103 S. Ct. at 511. The Court's conclusion that section 16C was standardless
was based on the law's delegation of "veto power" over governmental licensing authority to churches without requiring "reasons, findings, or reasoned conclusions."
Id.
79. For a discussion of the Lemon test, see notes 56-58 and accompanying text
supra.

80. 103 S. Ct. at 511. The majority was concerned that a church, in addition to
insulating itself from undesirable neighbors, could "favor liquor licenses for members
of that congregation or adherents of that faith." Id. Regardless of the probability of
such action by the church, the majority concluded that the establishment clause required some guarantee that the delegated power would be exercised in a religiously
neutral way. See id. (citations omitted). The Court rejected the appellant's argument
that the Beverages Control Commission had the authority to reject or ignore any
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In considering the third phase of the Lemon inquiry, the majority reasoned that section 16C resulted in the very "fusion of governmental and religious functions" which was feared by the Framers when the establishment
clause was adopted."' The Court found that, by substituting the unguided
and unilateral power of a church for the reasoned decision-making of a legislative body, "the statute enmeshe[d] religious organizations in the processes
of government." ' 82 In holding that section 16C violated the establishment
clause, the Court concluded that "few entanglements could be more offen' 83
sive to the spirit of the Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, characterized the state statute as a "quite
sensible Massachusetts liquor zoning law. '" 4 He praised the state's refineobjection filed by a church for discriminatory or illegal reasons, a contention directly
contradicted by an interpretation by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. See 1d. at
511 n.9 (citing Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 377 Mass. 83, 90, 92
and n.23; 384 N.E.2d 1223 (1979)).
81. Id. at 511-12 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)) (citations omitted). The Court first noted that it had not previously considered the entanglement implications of a statute visiting significant governmental authority in churches. Id. at 512. The objective of its inquiry, the Court stated, was to
prevent "the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other." Id.
(citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614). The Court opined that at the time of the Revolution,
Americans feared political oppression through the union of church and state. Id. at
512 n. 10. Chief Justice Burger implied that, given the existence of grants of political
control to ecclesiastical institutions over the issuance of liquor permits in eighteenthcentury England, this fusion of church and state was precisely the situation against
which the framers wished to protect. See id. (citing S. & B. WEBB, THE HISTORY OF
LIQUOR LICENSING IN ENGLAND, PRINCIPALLY FROM 1700 TO 1830 8 n.1, 62-67,
102-103 (1903)). See also B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 98-99 N.3 (1967).

The Court aptly pointed out that historians have recognized that Americans, at
the time of the Revolution, feared "not only a denial of religious freedom, but the
danger of political oppression through a union of civil and ecclesiastical control."
103 S. Ct. at 512 n.10. In England, from 1750 through the 1790's, the established
clergy was vested with discretionary authority to withhold from applicants seeking to
serve alcohol the certificates of approval required by law. See S. & B. WEBB, THE
HISTORY OF LIQUOR LICENSING IN ENGLAND, PRINCIPALLY FROM 1700 TO 1830 8
n.i, 62-67, 102-103 (1903). The licenses were frequently restricted in practice to adherents of the dominant sect. d. at 10 n.1, 38 n.1. This led to certain sects, such as
the Roman Catholics, being denied licenses to sell liquor. See id. Further, these licensing practices resulted in abuses of discretion which arose out of the English Justice's "threefold power of selection, power of withdrawal, and power to impose
conditions" on the issuance of liquor licenses. d. These abuses of delegated authority were, at least in part, an impetus for the Beer Act of 1830 which reformed the
liquor licensing process so as to break down "the local veto exercised by the squire,
the clergyman, and the principal inhabitants." Id.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 512. The Court also noted that such an entanglement
presented the opportunity for "political fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines." Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623). For a discussion of the Court's
notion of "political divisiveness along religous lines," see note 58 supra.

83. 103 S. Ct. at 512. In light of its finding that section 16C was violative of the
establishment clause of the first amendment, the Court did not reach appellee's due
process claim. Id. n. 11.
84. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority's aim to prove that section 16C was apparently a "sinister religious attack on secular government reminis-
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ment of the absolute prohibition under the original statute,8 5 concluding
that the power of a state to ban absolutely the sale of liquor within a reason86
able distance of a church, a course of action "suggested" by the majority,
necessarily encompassed the power to enact the less protective objection requirement of section 16C. 8 7 Justice Rehnquist suggested that the majority
had been too quick to characterize section 16C as a grant of "veto power" to
churches. 88 Further, even if such a delegation of legislative authority had
been affected, Justice Rehnquist argued that it was inappropriate and unnecessary to invoke the Lemon analysis in order to find it invalid.8 9 Justice
Rehnquist also disagreed with the result reached by the majority under the
Lemon test, particularly with the conclusion that the statute "advanced"
religion. 9 0
In reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in Grendel's Den, it is submitted that the court was trapped between the Scylla of validating a Massachucent of St. Bartholemew's Night" provoked Justice Rehnquist to remark that great
cases, hard cases, and, now, "silly cases .. .make bad law." Id. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist opined that the

evolving treatment of the grant of liquor licenses as evidenced by section 16C was the
sort of legislative refinement which should be encouraged rather than forbidden. Id.
For a discussion of the historical evolution of section 16C, see note 3 supra.
86. See 103 S. Ct. at 510-11. Justice Rehnquist characterized this suggestion by
the majority as a concession of the constitutional validity of flat prohibitions. Id. at
513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority, however, stated only that such a law
would be entitled to "substantial weight" on review. In a footnote detailing the state
statutes imposing such a flat ban, the majority clearly expressed no "opinion as to the
constitutionality of any statute other than that of Massachusetts." Id. at 511 & n.7.
87. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the flat ban
championed by the majority was actually more protective of churches and more restrictive of liquor sales than the Massachusetts statute. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted
that the flexibility of section 16C resulted from the state's sensible conclusion that, if
a church located within the 500-foot radius did not object, there would be no reason
to deny the license. Id. He continued, "Nothing in the Court's opinion persuades me
why the more rigid prohibition would be constitutional, but the more flexible not."

Id.
88. See id. Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Court's incorporation of the
term "veto" from the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Amo, and its reliance thereon for its decision. Id. He criticized the majority
for apparently concluding that section 16C "constitutes churches as third houses of
the Massachusetts Legislature" without engaging in any independent analysis to determine the scope of the delegation. Id.
89. Id. Justice Rehnquist emphatically denied that a three-part analysis was
necessary to determine that a statute which delegated actual legislative power to
churches was a violation of the establishment clause. Id.
90. Id. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the
concededly valid purpose of protecting a religious institution from an incompatible
use could not be achieved through means which were "religiously neutral," and so it
did not advance the inquiry to rely on this intention. See id. "Whether the ban is
unconditional or may be invoked only at the behest of a particular church, it is not
'religiously neutral' so long as it enables a church to defeat the issuance of a liquor
license when a similarly situated bank could not do the same." Id. at 514 (Rehnquist,

J., dissenting).
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setts statute which clearly violated the mandates of the establishment clause
and the Charybdus of impinging upon a state's power to zone liquor establishments pursuant to the tenth and twenty-first amendments.9 1 The Court
was, however, able to chart a narrow course between these two evils; in striking down section 16C, the Court ruled that the statute delegated the power
to zone to religious institutions which excessively entangled the affairs of
church and state. 92 A deferential attitude towards a state's power under the
tenth and twenty-first amendments should not necessitate a submission of
first amendment guarantees. These amendments reserve power to the states,
not to religious institutions to whom the state legislature has delegated these
93
powers.
Since there is a dirth of judicial precedent on the scope of the nexus
among the first, tenth and twenty-first amendments, 94 the court properly
succumbed to the irresistable impulse to appeal to history. 9 5 The American
colonies which harbored established churches during both the colonial and
Revolutionary War periods insisted on separating the secular tools of civil
91. See id. at 509-12. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning in concluding
that section 16C violated the mandates of the establishment clause, see notes 77-87

and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the states' broad powers under the
tenth and twenty-first amendments, see notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
92. See 103 S. Ct. at 512. Since the holding of Grendel'sDen is restricted to statutes identical to section 16C, the Court has not severely limited the scope of the
state's power pursuant to the tenth and twenty-first amendments. See id. at 510-11
n.7. A state may impose an absolute ban on liquor outlets within a reasonable distance from churches or allow the church to be heard at a hearing before the appropriate licensing authority. See id. at 510. For a discussion of those states which
impose a total ban on liquor outlets within a prescribed distance of a church, see note
20supra. For a discussion of jurisdictions which direct the local licensing authority to
consider the proximity of the proposed liquor outlet in deciding whether to grant a
liquor permit, see note 21 supra. For a discussion of the Massachusetts Legislature's
amendment of section 16C in response to the decision in Grendel's Den, see note 119
infra.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 510 & n.5; Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761,
764 (D. Mass. 1981). See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
94. See 103 S. Ct. at 512; Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 766
(D. Mass. 1981).
95. See 103 S. Ct. at 510 (quoting Reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by
a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802), reprinted in 8
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1861)). Authors have suggested that the Supreme Court's invocation of historical analysis from the perspective
of the Framers is somewhat misplaced. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 43, at 849. These authors state that since the religion clauses were ratified as
part of the Bill of Rights, the intention of the ratifying states is of equal import in
determining the meaning of the clauses. Id. at 850. Further, since the first amendment was only a limitation of the actions of the federal government, this fact could be
read as an affirmance of state sovereignty over the subject. Id. Since in some states
there were close church-state ties at the time of the Revolution, the first amendment
insured that the federal government would not interfere with state preferences for
particular religions. Id. It is submitted that while there may be no clear history as to
the meaning of the establishment clause, it is plain that section 16C is abhorrent to
the ideals of those who fled seventeenth and eighteenth-century England. See note 81
'nfra.
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power from the spiritual authority of the church. 96 More significantly, the
9 7
colonists fled the despotic "fusion of governmental and religious functions
exemplified by legal arrangements which vested Anglican church officials
with discretionary authority to withhold licenses to serve liquor. 98 It is suggested that section 16C evinces a practice of enmeshing church and state
functions akin to the liquor-licensing practices of England from which the
99
Framers and their forebears fled over two hundred years ago.
Although the Massachusetts licensing scheme purported to go no further than to provide surroundings accommodating to the free exercise of religion, 1° ° in practice, section 16C did not achieve its avowed secular purpose
of protecting "spiritual, cultural, and educational centers" from the "hurlyburly associated with liquor outlets." 10 1 Rather, the statute provided
churches and religiously-affiliated schools with wide discrimination to pick
and choose their neighbors, effectively allowing private religious discrimination sanctioned by law. 10 2 Moreover, since a 500-foot radius of the Holy
Cross Church encompasses all of the enormously valuable properties located
96. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719-27 app. 11 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf.J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 43, at 850 (in

some states, close ties existed between church and state).
97. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
98. For a discussion of the legal arrangements which vested Anglican church
officials with authority to withhold liquor licenses, see note 81 supra.
99. See 103 S. Ct. at 511. It is noted that Grendel's Den did, in fact, allege in its
complaint against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that the Holy Cross Church
required monetary "contributions" from potential licensees as a prerequisite to not
exercising its power of objection. Amended Complaint of Grendel's Den, Inc. 12,
cited tn Brief for Appellee at 3 n.3, Grendel's Den, 103 S. Ct. at 505. See also note 5
supra. The district court agreed with Grendel's Den's position, stating that section
16C delegated political power that may have been wielded by a church to realize
economic advantage. 495 F. Supp. at 767. This issue, however, became irrelevant
when the parties limited the issue for resolution to whether section 16C was violative
of the constitution on its face rather than as applied. See Grendel's Den, 662 F.2d at
103. For a discussion of the parties' stipulation narrowing the issues on appeal, see
note 7 supra.
100. Grendel's Den, 662 F.2d at 96.

101. Although the Court stated that while it would assume for purposes of the
facial attack that section 16C actually furthered its avowed purpose, it noted that the
existence of 26 liquor outlets surrounding the Holy Cross Church casts some doubt on
this assumption. 103 S. Ct. at 510 n.6. Appellant's brief indicated that some of these
existing liquor outlets obtained licenses prior to the enactment of 16C. Reply Brief
for Appellants at 8 n.4, Grende's Den, 103 S. Ct. at 505. Although the previous statute
absolutely prohibited licenses within the prescribed area, licensing within the proscribed radius may have been achieved either by transfer of a pre-existing license to a
location nearer to the church from a more distant location, or because the Holy Cross
Church was not in existence at that time. Id. Nevertheless, the existence of these
liquor establishments while an absolute ban was in force suggests that the effectiveness of even an absolute prohibition is questionable. See id.
102. For a historical discussion of the abuses by churches of liquor-licensing
practices, see notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra. As noted by Justice Rehnquist, however, the ability of the Court to discern the potential for abuse does not
render section 16C violative of the establishment clause. 103 S. Ct. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rather, if a church were to use its authority to advance the
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within the social and cultural centre known as Harvard Square, the potential for political abuse through religious power to deny a liquor license was
great. '03

Despite the statute's inherent implication of the establishment clause, it
is suggested that the Court's invocation of the Lemon v. Kurtzman analysis was
not necessary to justify its conclusion. 104 The central issue which faced the
Court in its establishment clause analysis was whether section 16C delegated
legislative functions to private religious bodies. 10 5 It is submitted that, by
appropriating the "veto" language of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Arno v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 106 without independent
analysis of the reasoning behind that decision, the majority eschewed careful
scrutiny of this preliminary delegation question. 10 7 In failing to discuss
whether there was, in fact, a delegation of legislative authority to churches,
the Court was able to summarily avoid review of the broader issue: under
what conditions and to whom may the state delegate authority to proscribe
certain undesired land uses?' 0 8
It is suggested that the Court could have invalidated section 16C on due
process grounds, following the reasoning of Eubank, Roberge and Cusack.109
While it is acknowledged that section 16C dealt with a property use which
interests of itself and its own members, the statute could be tested through a challenge to the statute as applied to the injured party's parcel of land. See 1d.
It is submitted that by proscribing the definition of church as used in section
16C, the Massachusetts Legislature arguably differentiated between theistic and
nontheistic religions. See 103 S. Ct. at 509 n.3. For the text of the definition of
"church" as used in section 16C, see note 3 supra. Although this position was taken
by Grendel's Den, the Supreme Court, however, did not reach this issue. Id.
103. For a discussion of the importance of the location of Grendel's Den in relation to neighboring establishments, see note 2 supra.
104. See 103 S. Ct. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice
Rehnquist's belief that the Lemon test is not applicable to situations where there is a
clear breach of the wall of separation between church and state, see note 89 and
accompanying text, supra.
105. See 103 S. Ct. at 509- 10; id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 509 (citingArno, 377 Mass. 83, 89, 384 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 (1979)).
107. See id. Although the Court noted that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's interpretation as to the meaning of section 16C would be controlling, it in
fact disregarded the content of the Amo decision. See id. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Adopting the word "veto" from the Amo opinion, the majority did not
address the fact that while the Massachusetts Court had referred to section 16C's
delegation as a "veto power," it nonetheless concluded that the statute was not an
unconstitutional delegation, but rather, a provision for waiver of a statutory restriction. See id.; Amo, 377 Mass. at 88-89, 384 N.E.2d at 1227.
108. See 103 S. Ct. at 510 n.7. Although both petitioners and respondents raised
the issue of the nexus between section 16C and a lack of procedural due process on
appeal, the Supreme Court decided Grendel's Den on the establishment clause issue.
See note 106 zhfra. In so doing, the Court gave no indication as to the constitutionality of statutes containing "waiver" or "consent" provisions. See id. For a discussion of
"waiver" and "consent" provisions in zoning law, see note 22 and accompanying text
supra.

109. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D. Mass. 1981).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's aversion to uncontrolled delegation of legis-
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had a tendency to injure public health or morals under the mandate of Roberge,l 1o the statute was nonetheless unconstitutional under Eubank since it
allowed private property owners to impose restrictions upon the use of neighboring property rather than merely permitting a waiver of the protection or
modification of a lawful and reasonable legislative restriction or
prohibition. 'I'
In conclusion, the Court has opened the door to heightened judicial
review of state liquor and land use regulations, and its reasoning clearly indicates that such state regulation is particularly subject to scrutiny where it is
deemed to implicate a first amendment guarantee." 2 Significantly, despite
the Court's having facilitated the means for greater potential government
lative authority to private bodies as exhibited in Eubank, Roberge, and Cusack, see notes
27-36 and accompanying text supra.
It is submitted that the issue of the validity of section 16C on due process
grounds was properly before the Supreme Court for review. See note 5 supra. It is a
matter of policy, however, that the court will decide the case before it on the most
narrow constitutional ground. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936). Which of the two challenges to the constitutional validity of
section 16C, either due process or establishment clause, presented the more narrow
ground for deciding Grendel's Den is debatable. Justice Rehnquist on the one hand
would have apparently found the due process issue to be a more narrow ground for
the court's decision. Grendel's Den, 103 S. Ct. at 514 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His
belief was based upon the fact that the majority had intertwined the entanglement
prong of the Lemon test with the issue of unlawful delegation of legislative power, a
question more properly answered in terms of due process criteria. See id. It is asserted on the other hand that the Grendel's Den majority, although couching its entanglement analysis in terms of unlawful delegation, may have decided the case on the
more narrow establishment clause ground. Even though the Eubank, Roberge, and
Cusack holdings may appear easy to apply, these cases have never been analyzed in
the context of a delegation of legislative authority to a church. See itd. at 512. This
factor may have provoked the majority to refrain from any analysis of the due process
issue, particularly where the Court believed that there was a clear violation of establishment clause principles. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra
110. For a discussion of the limitation imposed by the Roberge Court on the decision in Cusack and Eubank, see notes 34-36 supra.
111. See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D. Mass. 1981).
For a discussion of some legal scholars' interpretation of the decisions in Eubank, Cusack and Roberge, see note 36 supra. While it may be contended that the Massachusetts Legislature intended to maintain a general prohibitory policy when it amended
section 16C in 1970, the intent of the lawmakers is conspicuously absent. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1974). Cf. Governor's Letter, 1970 Mass
House J., House Doc. 5125, cited in Reply Brief for Appellants at 30, n.24, Grendel's
Den, 103 S. Ct. at 505 (indicating governor's view that statute merely shifted burden
of objection to religious institutions without changing basic policy rationale for its
enactment).
Further, much like establishment clause analysis, "[d]ue process focuses on the
effect of the statutory scheme." See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761,
765 (D. Mass. 1981) (emphasis in original). The effect of section 16C is to vest uncontrolled zoning authority in private institutions. See id.
112. See 103 S. Ct. at 510. For a discussion of the higher level of judicial review
mandated when a liquor or land use regulation infringes upon a first amendment
guarantee, see notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
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support for religious institutions,1 13 the Burger Court, in Grendel's Den, has
drawn the line where the entanglement between church and states becomes
excessive.'' 4 In invoking the historical theory of excessive entanglement, the
Court has demonstrated the continuing vitality of this inquiry in assessing
the more traditional religious-civil relationships.' 15 The decision has, however, confirmed scholars' predictions that these traditionally-accepted areas
of church-state cooperation would be exposed to judicial reassessment on the
ground that such relationships would pose the threat of religiously-based
strife.' 16 Nonetheless, the lack of clarity and the unpredictability of the law
in this area makes any assessment of the place Grendel's Den will hold in future establishment clause analysis difficult to ascertain. 117
113. See E. CORWIN, supra note 12, at 128. For a discussion of the Court's approval of a statute providing for state reimbursement of parents for expenses incurred

in transporting their children to school, see notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of the Court's approval of a statute permitting a state to loan secular
textbooks to all school children within the state, see note 56 supra.
Professor Corwin's prediction that the Burger Court would continue to chart a
course of closer relations between church and state in the area of state aid to religious
institutions has borne true. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). In Mueller,
the court validated a Minnesota statute which allowed state taxpayers, in computing
their state income tax, to deduct expenses incurred in providing "tuition, textbooks
and transportation" for their children attending either elementary or secondary
school. Id. at 3071. The statute did not provide direct aid to religiously-affiliated
institutions, but rather, it provided indirect aid to such institutions by allowing tax

deductions for parents whose children attended these schools. Id. at 3064. Hence,
the Court reasoned that the "historic purposes" of the establishment clause do not
extend to such indirect or "attenuated financial benefit." Id. at 3069.
114. See 103 S. Ct. at 512. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the entanglement problems encountered by section 16C, see notes 81-83 supra.
Although the Court focused on the entanglement inquiry under the Lemon test in
order to facilitate its treatment of the problems engendered by section 16C's delegation of legislative authority to religious institutions, the Court also found that the
statute had the "primary effect of advancing religions." See note 78 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted, however, that the Court's conclusion that a total

prohibition on the sale of alcohol within a specified distance of a church would have
avoided the problems created by section 16C's unlawful delegation of legislative
power serves to weaken its advancement theory. See 103 S. Ct. at 510-11; id. at 513
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 120 (Stewart, J.,

concurring) (where a state has legislatively mandated that no liquor license shall be
granted within a specified distance of a church or school, no delegation issue would
arise). It is logically inconsistent to suggest, on the one hand, an absolute ban on
liquor distribution near a church does not have the effect of advancing religion, while

holding, on the other hand, that a prohibition which applies only if the affected
institution objects does have such an effect. See 103 S. Ct. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Although some distinction may be drawn between these two types of
statutes on the issue of delegation, the legislature has in both instances mandated

partiality in favor of the designated institution; indeed, its very purpose is protective.
See id.
115. See 103 S. Ct. at 512. See also The Entanglement Test, supra note 42, at 1238-

39.
116. See The Entanglement Test, supra note 42, at 1239.

For a discussion of the

Court's belief that section 16C had the potential to cause strife between religious and
civil components of society, see notes 78 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
117. For a discussion of the Court's own recognition that they have sacrificed

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 5

1982-83]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1027

Finally, from a more pragmatic standpoint, the Court has failed to define the constitutional parameters of permissible delegation of legislative authority in zoning matters.""8 The Court did, however, establish some
concrete signposts within which states may permissibly protect favored institutions through land-use regulation.' 19
Mark C Levy
clarity and predictability for flexibility in their establishment clause decisions, see
note 66 and accompanying text supra.
118. See 103 S. Ct. at 510. For a discussion of the consequences of the Court's
failure to discuss the constitutionality of the delegation of legislative authority in
zoning consent provisions, see notes 109-111 supra.
Justice Rehnquist suggested that to invalidate section 16C on establishment
clause grounds would stifle the creativity exhibited by the Massachusetts Legislature
in the area of land-use planning. See 103 S. Ct. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This reasoning exhibits Justice Rehnquist's view that the Court has too often indulged in the "federalization" of areas of law traditionally entrusted to state care.
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 792 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Such a view goes on to postulate that such a trend "will only thwart state searches for
better solutions in [areas] where [the] Court should encourage state experimentation." Id. at 773 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is suggested, however, that Massachusetts' experimentation in the case of section 16C is not so much attributable to
creativity as it is to a desire to tailor the statute to the needs of religious institutions.
See note 101 supra. This attempt to favor religious institutions is a violation of the
establishment clause. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra. Even Justice
Rehnquist would concede that a state's creativity in the area of legislation must give
way when such legislation abridges a constitutional provision. See Santosky, 455 U.S.
at 773. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. See 103 S. Ct. at 510. For a discussion of viable alternatives such as absolute prohibition and legislative hearing, see note 77 supra.
The author notes that on July 12, 1983, the Massachusetts Legislature, through
emergency law, amended section 16C to conform to the mandates of the Grendel'sDen
Court. See 1983 Mass. Acts 266. The newly amended version of section 16C provides
as follows:
Premises, except those of an innholder and except such parts of buildings as are located ten or more floors above street level, located within a
radius of five hundred feet of a school or church shall not be licensed for the
sale of alcoholic beverages unless the local licensing authority determines in
writing and after a hearing that the premises are not detrimental to the
educational and spiritual activities of said school or church; . ...
d. The amended section 16C substitutes the words "local licensing authority" for
the word "church." See note 3 supra. Thus, by providing for a legislative decision on
the detrimental effects of a liquor outlet on a neighboring church or school following
a legislative hearing where such institution's views may be heard, the Massachusetts
Legislature has resolved the constitutional conflict inherent in the 1970 version of
section 16C.
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